Introduction
From Sierra Leone to Tajikistan and Indonesia's Aceh Province, civil war has erupted in countries suffering from persistent poverty or sharp economic decline. These conflicts sap already depleted national resources and further cripple the fragile economies of some of the world's poorest countries, while claiming millions of innocent lives. They may also suck in neighboring countries, exacerbate regional instability, and require costly military intervention by outside powers. Civil wars often have significant security implications for more distant peoples as they are ideal incubators of transnational security threats such as terrorism, weapons proliferation, criminal activity and infectious disease.
Recent examples of poor countries that have plunged into civil war abound. Sierra Leone was one of the world's poorest countries with a per capita GNI of $180 when its brutal civil war broke out in 1991. 1 The war resulted in the U.N. authorizing the deployment of a 17,500-strong peacekeeping mission, at a cost of $2.8 billion.
2 Ivory Coast -once considered a model of relative prosperity and stability in Africa -experienced steadily declining per capita GNI which dropped from $1,120 in 1980 to $650 in 2000, when civil conflict erupted for the first time since independence.
In Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo), two full-scale wars erupted in the mid-1990s, ultimately resulting in the deaths of an estimated 4 million people and requiring the eventual deployment of 17,000 U.N. peacekeepers. The conflicts' immediate precipitating factors were external. 3 However, domestic factors helped fuel Congolese rebel movements that fought a simultaneous and sustained civil war. These factors likely include decades of intense kleptocracy, lack of basic infrastructure throughout the vast country, inter-communal tensions manipulated by long-time dictator Mobutu Sese Seko and his successors, and dire poverty. In 1995, Zaire's GNI per capita stood at $130, making Zaire the second poorest country in the world. Today, the DRC remains violent in places and highly unstable. The risk of renewed conflict remains high, in part because economic conditions have not improved in any meaningful way: GNI per capita remains the second lowest in the world, having dropped to $120.
While in recent years, civil wars have been all too frequent in Sub-Saharan Africa, they have afflicted every other region as well. In Southeast Asia, the 1997 Asian financial crisis caused a run on Indonesia's currency and that country's sudden economic collapse: after a period of steady growth, real per capita GNI dropped to $670 in 1998, from a post-independence high of $1,120 just one year earlier. The following year, in 1999, fighting erupted between government forces and independence fighters in the western province of Aceh, Indonesia's fourth poorest province, causing approximately 3000 deaths over a period of three years. 4 In the Western Hemisphere, Haiti ranks as one of the world's poorest countries. Its per capita income dropped drastically from a post-independence high of $430 in 1991 to $260 in 1994, following a violent military coup and political upheaval which have prompted the UN to deploy four successive stabilization missions to that country. The political violence was instigated by dictatorial regimes, and is exacerbated by high unemployment rates and vast disparities in income and access to health and education. Yet Haiti's grinding poverty -GNI per capita remains below $400 and has stagnated for over a decade -has certainly also contributed to the ongoing civil strife in that island nation.
The pattern is similar in the Middle East. According to the World Bank, citizens in the West Bank and Gaza have experienced a 30 percent decline in real GDP per capita since 1999, before the start of the second Intifada, which has cost an estimated 3,871 Palestinian and 1011 Israeli lives. 5 Since the cut off of international aid following Hamas' victory in Spring of 2006, these already dire economic conditions have worsened. According to a recent U.N. report, projections for the Palestinian economy "point to unprecedented unemployment, poverty and social tensions."
6 Now these conditions combine with political divisions to threaten both civil war between Hamas and Fatah and dissolution of the Palestinian Authority. 7 Finally, in Iraq, civil conflict is intensifying and devolving into full-scale civil war. Upon leaving the post of commander of the Multinational Corps in Iraq in late 2006, Lt. Gen. Peter Chiarelli said that finding jobs for "angry young men" and taking them "off the street" was "absolutely critical to...lowering the level of violence" and "just as important as growing the size of their army."
8 To date, however, relatively little attention has been devoted to the economic drivers of this conflict. No doubt, the civil conflict in Iraq is rooted substantially in sectarian differences that were exacerbated by Saddam's tyranny. It is stoked by foreign jihadists, meddling neighbors and by resentment of the U.S. occupation. Yet, roughly 50 percent of Iraqis were unemployed in 2005 and real per capita GNI stands at only a fraction of what it was in the 1980s. Deteriorating economic conditions have almost certainly contributed in some measure to the rising violence in Iraq.
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These and other cases of civil conflict may each in isolation offer policymakers some useful insights. Yet, viewed together, they beg an overarching question: is there a significant and demonstrable link between income poverty and the risk that a country will slide into civil war? Could U.S. foreign policy benefit from greater emphasis on promoting economic growth and alleviating poverty? The answers to these questions bear directly on several current challenges to U.S. national security from the Middle East to South Asia and Africa.
Poverty Matters
For years, a debate has raged in academic circles over the principal causes of civil conflict. Is it ethnicity, grievance, rebel greed, topography or venal leadership? Today, an important element of this debate has been resolved: recent academic research on the causes of conflict demonstrates compellingly that countries with low income per capita are at increased risk of civil conflict.
10 Recent statistical research on poverty and conflict suggests that for a country at the fiftieth percentile for income (like Iran today), the risk of experiencing civil conflict within five years is 7-11 percent; for countries at the tenth percentile (like Ghana or Uganda today), the risk rises to 15-18 percent. 11 The graph below illustrates the decline in conflict risk associated with higher increments of GDP per capita: Capita, 1960 Capita, -1999 This finding is strongly corroborated by a broad range of scholarship. 13 It is important because it challenges the popular theory that civil conflict derives primarily from ethnic, religious or cultural cleavages. Prior research on the causes of civil war emphasized the socioeconomic, political and cultural grievances that can lead to widespread discontent and spark rebellion. In an influential 1993 Foreign Affairs article on the "Clash of Civilizations," for instance, Samuel Huntington speculated that the "dominating source of conflict" in the aftermath of the Cold War would be ethnic differences between people with a distinct "language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and… subjective self-identification." 14 Likewise, Robert Kaplan and Daniel Patrick Moynihan have also presumed that wars caused by ethnic and cultural divisions would predominate in coming decades. 15 Starting in the mid-to late 1990s, however, scholars began to reconsider the grievance hypothesis and its applicability to brutal conflicts in some of the world's most impoverished countries, like Sierra Leone, Azerbaijan, Cambodia and Afghanistan. They questioned the notion that such wars were fought over ethnic grievances, and suggested instead that "resource wars" are fueled by the "greed" of war entrepreneurs who secure benefits from ongoing and widespread violence in their societies. This observation led to a new research agenda which sought to explain civil conflict as "a way of creating an alternative system of profit, power and even protection." 16 Nearly a decade later, this literature has produced strong empirical evidence that irrespective of ethnicity's role, poverty as measured by low national income per capita bears a strong and statistically significant relationship to increased risk of civil conflict. 17 Research on the political or grievance-based roots of conflict continues, and scholars acknowledge that conflict is a complex phenomenon attributable to multiple causes. 18 However, recent scholarship does not dispute the finding that per capita income has a direct, negative relationship to civil conflict risk.
This paper reviews for policymakers, practitioners and scholars, the latest evidence that low income per capita is a major risk factor for civil war. 19 It then examines what we don't yet fully understand: namely,
Probability of Observing a New Conflict
Per Capita GDP Average GDP per capita for countries that experienced war within 5 years is $1,100. Average GDP per capita for countries that did not experience war within 5 years is $5,764.
There are slight variations in the four studies' approach and findings. Some of the variation concerning the precise impact of different levels of per capita income on conflict is due to methodological differences, including different definitions of internal conflict. 27 Sambanis has noted that misunderstandings and disagreements with respect to coding civil wars are common in this literature and can contribute to differences in findings. 28 Yet, pluralism in terms of methodological approaches and conflict data across these studies has allowed for testing the robustness of the findings. 29 Scholars have also tested them using both in-depth case-study and cross national statistical methods and other variations in methodology, yet the statistically significant relationship between low income per capita and conflict holds throughout. 30 Furthermore, data quality has improved. 31 Evidence also shows that income poverty influences how long civil war will last, in addition to increasing the risk of conflict onset. Fearon as well as Collier, Hoeffler and Oxford University economist Mans Soderbom have found that income per capita is inversely related to civil war duration. 32 This result is particularly important given that, by some estimates, civil wars last on average between seven and sixteen years.
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Income.decline
In addition to the importance of a country's level of income per capita, a drop in income -measured by a country's per capita GDP growth rate -may also foreshadow conflict. 34 While the relationship between changes in GDP per capita and the chance of civil war is not as robust as a country's level of GDP per capita, there is strong evidence in its favor. 35 Collier and Hoeffler find a 1 percent increase in the GDP growth rate reduces the risk of conflict by about 1 percent. 36 They suggest that the dual effect of both low levels of per capita GDP and slow or negative economic growth -a poor country that is making little if any growth gains -"directly and substantially" increases the risk of conflict. 37 Particularly strong evidence for the conflict-inducing effects of negative growth shocks was brought to bear in a 2004 study on conflict in Africa conducted by economist Edward Miguel and others. In order to address methodological concerns about endogeneity in prior analyses of this relationship, Miguel and his peers use rainfall variation as an instrumental variable for economic growth. 38 They find that, for African countries, a negative growth shock of five percentage points increases the risk of civil war by nearly 50 percent in the following year.
The.conflict.trap
It is also clear that poverty and conflict interact in a negative, mutually reinforcing cycle. Because civil wars tend to destroy livelihoods and in some cases entire economies, a 2003 World Bank report co-authored by Collier and others describe the relationship between low income and civil war as a "conflict trap." 39 The report explains that conflict exacerbates conditions of poverty for at least two reasons. First, civil wars hamper economic growth and impede properly functioning market economies. Development economist Lisa Chauvet, along with Collier and Hoeffler have worked on this issue independently and they estimate that following conflict onset, it takes a decade for a country to reestablish pre-war levels of economic activity. They find that on average, economic growth falls by 1.6 percent every year that a conflict continues in a poor country. 40 Second, the World Bank's report explains that conflict exacerbates poverty by siphoning public resources away from other budget priorities like health care and education. Higher levels of military spending lead to a "further lowering of welfare." 41 In peacetime, the average developing country allocates 2.8 percent of GDP to military spending, while during civil war, this average rises to 5 percent. 42 Some scholars have estimated the costs to GDP of increased military spending in developing countries experiencing conflict: over a period of seven years, this spending leads to income loss of an additional 2 percent of national income. 43 The "trap" effect is magnified because in addition to breeding poverty (which itself increases the likelihood of renewed conflict), conflict also breeds more conflict. 44 As the World Bank finds, "once a country has had a conflict it is in far greater danger of further conflict: commonly, the chief legacy of a civil war is another war." 45 Collier determines that countries that have suffered a civil conflict had a 22.3 percent risk of experiencing conflict before the war started; after the war, the predicted risk of a second war jumped to 38.6 percent. 46 Furthermore, repeat civil wars come at great cost to human life. Renewal of civil conflict in Sudan, Rwanda and Angola, for example, resulted in the loss of millions of lives in the 1980s and 1990s. To date, however, there is no agreement on why conflict increases the risk of further conflict. Some posit that conflicts ostensibly fought over enduring differences based on race or religion are likely to recur. 47 Others suggest that when conflicting parties suffer great losses, retribution is likely to lead to conflict recurrence. 48 Still others argue that conflict recurs when peace-building strategies fail to deal with war profiteers who have an interest in war's continuation. 49 In sum, there is now little doubt among scholars that low national income per capita increases the risk of civil war. We also know that low income per capita tends to prolong existing conflicts, and that a decline in per capita income can make more countries vulnerable to civil conflict. Because civil war impairs economic performance, exacerbating poverty, poor countries that experience conflict are at risk of getting stuck in a conflict trap.
Why Poor Countries Are at Risk
Despite the robustness of the empirical relationship between low income and conflict, there remains substantial debate as to why this relationship holds. There are two dominant explanations of the link between low income per capita and conflict. The first emphasizes opportunities for rebellion, while the other focuses on state capacity. Research on several correlates of poverty, especially large youth populations, low levels of education, and natural resource dependence, provides insight into the potential causal pathways through which income per capita impacts conflict risk. However, scholars have examined the influence of these various factors with varying degrees of rigor and success. In order to generate more specific policy recommendations that target the causes of a conflict as precisely as possible, future research should address these and other research gaps, refining our understanding of precisely how poverty impacts conflict risk.
The first explanation, put forth by Collier and Hoeffler, emphasizes the conditions under which a rebellion becomes financially and militarily viable. In their words, "in order to create and maintain a rebel organization, the rebels have to be paid and military equipment has to be purchased." 50 While in most countries, there are some groups willing to resort to armed conflict to attain their aims, only in a small subset of these countries do rebels actually have the financing and military equipment to do so. Rebels are thus seen as rational actors, and civil war is "the result of unusual conditions that enable a business organization -the rebel group -to be viable during what is typically a very long period of violent conflict." 51 To support their theory, Collier and Hoeffler identify and test proxies for conditions that make rebellion feasible and sustainable. They suggest, for instance, that rebels benefit from low prices for weapons and military equipment and cheap labor (e.g., recruits are more readily available when income per capita, economic growth or male secondary schooling rates are low).
Fearon and Laitin's interpretation of how low income leads to rebellion is somewhat different: they also seek to identify what makes insurgency "feasible" and "attractive," but focus on the state's lack of capacity to deter and defeat insurgencies. 52 Thus, a poor, weak state is more vulnerable to rebellion. In their framework, important determinants affecting the balance of power between states and rebels include: whether a state is newly independent (and thus, still fragile); political instability in a country; a large population, which requires greater police capacity to suppress insurgency; and oil dependency, which Fearon and Laitin consider to be associated with weak state capacity. For Fearon and Laitin, low national income per capita is particularly important: it proxies for a state's financial, administrative, police and military capabilities. It also allows rebels to recruit "young men to the life of a guerrilla." 53 They argue that high income per capita indicates well-developed infrastructure such as roads, and a greater degree of central government control over rural areas. More developed infrastructure and greater government control favor governments over insurgents, who can otherwise hide in less centrally controlled terrain and benefit from better knowledge of the geography and people in rural areas.
Scholars continue to investigate competing hypotheses about how poor countries offer opportunities for rebellion and lack capacity to quell civil violence. While the jury is still out on which hypothesis is more accurate, research on youth bulges, low educational attainment and resource dependence seems to reinforce Collier and Hoeffler's opportunity cost hypothesis. By contrast, additional research is needed to determine the impact of weak state capacity on conflict outcomes.
Poor.countries.tend.to.have.large.youth.bulges
In low-income states, demographic patterns characterized by a large youth population, known as a "youth bulge," are more likely due to high fertility rates, and may help to explain why poor countries often succumb to civil conflict. 54 While the relationship between poverty and demographics is complicated, most scholars agree that within countries, the poorest households generally tend to have the most children. 55 Almost 60 percent of the world's poor are under 25 years old. 56 Youth bulges are found mainly in the developing world, and are particularly severe in Africa. Multiple explanations have been advanced to explain this trend. Research shows that parents may have more children in order to cope with the scarcity of basic facilities and environmental resources in impoverished areas. 57 High fertility rates may exacerbate the 'poverty trap': the U.N. Population Fund reports that "[l]ong-term demographic and economic data indicate that high fertility raises absolute levels of poverty by slowing economic growth, reducing the poverty reduction that growth would have helped deliver, and skewing the distribution of consumption against the poor." 58 Research has linked youth bulges to conflict risk, lending support to Collier and Hoeffler's argument that poverty increases opportunities for rebellion because large numbers of youth provide a ready potential supply of rebel combatants. For example, a recent Population Action International report finds that, "[o]n average, the decline in the annual birth rate of five births per thousand people corresponded to a decline of about 5 percent in the likelihood of civil conflict during the following decade-descending from more than 40 percent likelihood in the earliest phase of demographic transition to less than 5 percent in the latest." 59 Henrik Urdal of Oslo's International Peace Research Institute finds that a youth bulge, defined as the percentage of the total adult population that is aged 15 to 24 years old, in combination with high infant mortality rates (often a proxy for poverty) has a statistically significant relationship to civil war. Specifically, all else being equal, countries experiencing youth bulges of 35 percent run three times the risk of conflict compared to countries with youth populations equivalent to the median for developed countries. 60 Furthermore, the conflict-inducing effect of youth bulges is particularly severe for countries with negative growth. 61 In a policy paper for the Millennium Challenge Corporation, Humphreys and University of Michigan scholar Ashutosh Varshney note that, with the exception of the former Yugoslavia, all recent episodes of mass violence have taken place in countries with high ratios of youths to adults -roughly two youths for every one adult, using 25 years of age as the threshold separating the two. Education.levels.tend.to.be.low.in.poor.countries Low educational enrollment is also related to poverty and bears relevance to the debate on why poverty influences conflict risk. Clearly, other factors, such as societal gender norms, impact education participation rates in a country, but overall, the under-educated tend to be concentrated in the poorest countries. 63 In the years 2000 to 2004, while net secondary school enrollment was 92 and 91 percent for girls and boys in industrialized countries, respectively, these figures were 26 percent and 30 percent in the least developed countries. 64 While the empirical literature on conflict has not focused as closely on educational attainment as it has on other factors like per capita income, some research indicates that the level of education is negatively related to conflict risk. The Political Instability Task Force found that secondary school enrollment has a statistically significant, negative relationship with conflict risk. 65 Collier and Hoeffler have also found that increasing enrollment rates in secondary schools by 10 percent can reduce the average risk of conflict by three percentage points, and that male secondary school rates are negatively related to the duration of conflict. 66 Their explanation for this relationship is that as educational attainment rises, the potential income that rebel recruits would have to forgo in order to join a rebellion rises, making it less likely that rebellion will occur. Some recent examples fit this explanation well: for instance, survey data from ex-combatants in Sierra Leone's civil war indicates that most recruits were young and poor, and close to 80 percent had left school before joining a rebel group, in part due to school closings as the country's infrastructure deteriorated in the lead up to the war. 67 Research on the relationship between levels of educational attainment and conflict risk remains preliminary, however. As Sambanis has noted, the quality of education (e.g., the degree to which ideology, such as nationalism, colors public school educational materials) may be as relevant to rebel recruitment as the level of education. 68 Furthermore, it is possible that in the presence of other conditions -a youth bulge and high unemployment, for instance -high levels of education may increase the risk of conflict, due to the frustration of unmet expectations. 69 Brookings Fellow Omer Taspinar finds that increasing poverty, inadequate education levels (due to lack of access to, and poor quality, education) and rising unemployment contribute to frustration, radicalism and support for political violence in Islamic countries. 70 Further research is needed to clarify education's role in contributing to conflict.
Poor.countries.tend.to.be.natural.resource-dependent
Another related area of research that has generated theories about why we observe a link between poverty and conflict centers on an economy's dependence on natural resources -including oil, minerals, agricultural and lootable commodities. Conflict research on this topic builds upon an extensive economics literature demonstrating that, on average, countries that are largely dependent on exports of high-value natural resource commodities -including many countries in Africa -experience slow GDP growth relative to resource-poor countries in East Asia, for instance. 71 Natural resource dependence has been linked both to the opportunity for rebellion argument, and to the weak state capacity theory. Some studies support the concept of rebellion opportunity: for example, one recent study found that only high value natural resources that rebels can easily capture and extract -"lootable" resources such as alluvial diamonds -impact the likelihood of war. 72 For example, rebels did capture, and may have been motivated by the prospect of, alluvial diamonds in Sierra Leone, Angola and Congo, and many analysts note that this funding source caused these wars to drag on for much longer than they otherwise would have. 73 Other arguments stress the impact of natural resources on state capacity and conflict risk. However, scholars differ on whether resources bolster or diminish state capacity. Resources may decrease the likelihood of conflict, because governments can direct their resource wealth towards effective bureaucracy, police, and military capacity that can help to defeat opposition. This explanation applies especially well to the case of wealthy Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia. 74 The opposing view posits that countries rich in natural resources are less likely to rely on tax revenue, and thus may have little incentive to be responsive to their citizens. 75 However, the relationship between natural resource dependence and a country's risk of conflict remains disputed, despite strong evidence to support a link between the two. 
Further.research.needed
These related findings afford useful insights but, pending further research, it remains difficult to determine which interpretations of the role of low income per capita in precipitating conflict holds in different contexts. To better test Collier and Hoeffler's explanation, Sambanis suggests using a more direct measure of the opportunity cost of rebellion, such as unemployment. High unemployment indicates a weak job market, which diminishes the opportunity costs of participation in rebellion. 77 Yet in developing countries with weak or nonexistent statistical data collection agencies and large informal economies, organizations such as the World Bank and the U.N. must collect unemployment data through household surveys. Obtaining reliable and comparable data through this method is challenging and the data often remains incomplete. 78 Still, as data improves and more innovative measurement techniques are developed, further research on these aspects of opportunity for rebellion should be possible.
Additional research is also needed to develop theory and contribute empirical evidence on state weakness. Proxies for state capacity other than income per capita -such as a government tax revenues per capita -should be developed and tested in order to improve our understanding of what aspects of state capacity matter most. 79 Sambanis underscores the importance of attempting to disentangle state capacity issues from factors like authoritarianism and corruption, which may help states that have low income and weak public services quell opposition and rebellion through bribery. 80 Further research could also shed light on alternative explanations of the relationship between low national income and conflict risk. For instance, in addition to weakening state capacity and lowering the opportunity cost of rebellion, low income per capita may erode a country's "culture of peace." 81 Where public education systems and state institutions fail to instill basic human values such as respect for human dignity, especially among vulnerable children growing up in conditions of extreme income poverty and destitution, violence can become normalized. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in places where violence has become the norm and a "culture of violence" has set in, particularly among the world's most destitute countries, this has contributed to a rise in prolonged, brutal civil conflicts. 82 Preliminary research on indicators for the presence or absence of a culture of peace at the national level suggests some promising leads, but further empirical analysis is needed. 83 Additional research on why poverty increases conflict risk would better enable decision-makers to prioritize among a variety of policy recommendations advanced in this literature. These include: deploying post-conflict development assistance peaking in the first five years, and for ten years total after conflict ends; making aid more poverty-focused in recipient countries; designing frameworks such as the Kimberly Process to prevent rebels from exploiting lootable, high-value commodities like diamonds; encouraging poor countries to diversify their economies; improving legal accountability in weak states; and investing into educational programs that promote and support a culture of peace. 84 Yet, despite this remaining gap in the research, we now know enough to glean some core policy prescriptions.
Policy Implications
By and large, the overarching and crucial policy recommendation emerging from research to date is the need to spur economic development and reduce poverty in developing countries, especially in the poorest states, in order to reduce civil conflict risk. While other factors associated with poverty may help drive conflict, the enduring robustness of low income per capita as a risk factor in a wide range of conflict studies leaves little doubt that policies that increase per capita income in the poorest countries will reduce their conflict risk. As Collier and his colleagues state, "if… whatever factors that are genuinely causal are highly correlated with income, then policies which increase income are likely to reduce the risk of conflict, and countries with low income are likely to be more at risk than those with higher income." 85 Sambanis holds that economic development on its own is insufficient to reduce the global incidence of civil conflict, but he also argues that in combination with conflict prevention measures, "raising levels of economic development will reduce the overall prevalence of political violence in the world." 86 Crucial to achieving this goal are improved economic policies and responsible governance in developing countries. Yet policy changes in the developing world must be coupled with effective developed country support, including: further debt relief; increased market access, including through the elimination of harmful agricultural subsidies; improved incentives for private sector development, particularly job-creating small and medium domestic enterprises and foreign direct investment; sustained support for civil society, the free press, women's rights and democratic institution-building; and more concerted efforts to prevent and terminate conflict, and to rebuild post-conflict states. Another important tool of particular interest to conflict researchers is foreign assistance. Since the 1990s, substantial evidence has shown that aid can be an effective policy instrument for promoting growth and thereby reducing poverty in lowincome countries. 87 Because foreign assistance tends to have greater beneficial impact in countries with good policy environments, however, allocating aid to weak or failing states remains a matter of debate, and a challenge. 88 Nevertheless, preliminary research on aid to "poorly performing" countries offers several important arguments in support of increasing development assistance to weak and failing states. 89 First, some scholars argue that while weak states may be aid-ineffective environments, there are important humanitarian, financial and security reasons for not leaving these countries behind. A recent study estimates that 80 percent of those living in extreme poverty, or upwards of 500 million people, live in states, which, by virtue of their weak institutions or poor policies, are difficult to assist. 90 Collier's research shows that once a country slides into extreme poverty, it tends to remain what the World Bank terms a Low Income Country Under Stress for 56 long years, costing the affected country and its neighbors an estimated $100 billion in lost income. 91 The price of experiencing civil war is higher still. Collier and Hoeffler estimate that the average conflict-torn developing country loses at least 105 percent of its pre-war GDP simply by virtue of experiencing conflict, and can cause neighboring countries to lose 43 percent of their pre-war GDP. Assuming the average GDP of low-income countries is $19.7 billion, Collier's conservative estimate is that the average civil war today costs developing countries about $54 billion. 92 A recent study commissioned by the U.K.'s Department for International Development suggests that for every £1 ($1.84) spent on conflict prevention (including development assistance) in countries like Rwanda, Sudan and Afghanistan, the international community could save on average £4 ($7.58) on expenditures in peacekeeping missions, humanitarian assistance and nation-building. 93 A second argument in favor of development assistance to low-income weak states is that many impoverished countries have the capacity to absorb higher levels of assistance than they currently receive. Development economists Victoria Levin and David Dollar find that some of the world's most impoverished and weak countries -such as Nigeria, Niger and Republic of Congo -are "aid orphans" that receive less aid per capita than is justified by both their level of poverty and institutional performance, while Collier and Dollar find that countries like Honduras, Lesotho and Uganda are receiving far too little, sustained economic assistance. 94 These findings are consistent with a recent OECD Development Assistance Committee report, which concludes that while overall aid flows to the developing world have become more poverty-driven in recent years, a "disproportionate share of aid has gone to middle-income and less poor countries… compared to what a pattern of allocation driven just by poverty criteria would imply." 95 Furthermore, Collier and Hoeffler argue that weakened post-conflict countries are especially capable of absorbing large volumes of aid. 96 Mozambique, for instance, received large amounts of aid and has achieved high rates of growth since the end of its civil war in 1992. 97 Collier and Hoeffler have estimated the effect of aid on a state with the characteristics of the average aid recipient country: in combination with improved government policies, they find that an aid increase of one dollar per capita in a low-income country sustained over a five-year period reduces the risk of conflict by about 30 percent. 98 Third, under certain conditions, aid to weak states may be effective irrespective of poor governance and the weak institutional environments in these countries. Several studies show that recipient countries' quality of economic governance notwithstanding, development assistance has been an effective policy tool for promoting growth in low-income countries, so long as aid levels remained below 25-40 percent of GDP. 99 Other scholars have shown that aid with short-term impact -aid to build roads and other infrastructure, to support agricultural and other productive sectors, and budget support -has helped spur economic growth within a short, four-year timeframe, even in countries with weak institutions or poor policies. 100 One study finds that aid has had beneficial impact on policy reform in a small set of countries with especially poor policy environments, although it appears to be less effective in smaller countries. 101 Finally, very preliminary policy analysis suggests several poverty reduction strategies that may be effective in weak states. Collier's research shows, for example, that aid other than technical assistance, as well as investment into secondary education, can help even the weakest and most impoverished states "turn around," effectively steering them on a path toward economic growth and policy reform. 102 As soon as a process of policy and institutional reform begins in weak states, technical assistance can then help accelerate economic growth and reduce poverty. The World Bank suggests providing more direct support for basic services such as health and education in failing states by splitting up provision into services that can each be delivered by a U.N. agency: UNICEF, for instance, might be tasked with child immunization in a failing state. 103 A more radical approach is to establish "independent service authorities," similar to the decentralized health management system created in Burkina Faso, which could be accountable to donors and responsible for the delivery of social services in low-income countries where governments have failed. 104 Alternatively, channeling humanitarian aid either through government agencies or NGOs to provide relief as well as support for basic services may also be effective. 105 Ultimately, however, additional research on potentially effective aid instruments in weak states remains sorely lacking and is urgently needed.
Despite these initial research findings and the emerging scholarly consensus that low national per capita income heightens the risk of civil conflict, global poverty alleviation as a means of enhancing regional and international security has not been a top policy priority, particularly in the United States. U.S. foreign assistance overall has increased in recent years. The most recent figures from the U.S. Agency for International Development indicate that U.S. Official Development Assistance (ODA) rose from $19.7 in 2004 to $27.5 billion in 2005, and now amounts to 0.22 percent of GNI. 106 Yet this results substantially from increases to Iraq and Afghanistan, which, as a recent Center for Global Development analysis shows, mask a decrease in aid to the rest of the world. 107 Most of the additional funding went to Iraq, which received $7.2 billion in additional assistance in 2005. U.S. aid to Afghanistan nearly doubled from 2004 to 2005, while assistance to the rest of the world dropped slightly from $15.9 to $15.7 billion. Despite these increases, the U.S. still ranked second to last among OECD donor countries in terms of official development assistance as a percentage of GNI in 2005. Moreover, increases in emergency humanitarian assistance and to the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) are salutary, and will help save lives. Yet this additional funding will do nothing to alleviate poverty in, or strengthen the capacity of, weak and failing states. The President's Millennium Challenge initiative also represents a significant new U.S. investment in development. Yet its focus on providing assistance to countries with strong policy environments already conducive to reform means that the poorest, weakest states are not eligible for this increased assistance. The list of 24 countries that the Millennium Challenge Corporation identifies as eligible for assistance in fiscal year 2007 excludes the world's weakest states. 108 Yet as a recent paper from the Center for Global Development notes, while aid to the poorest countries is inherently risky, it should be seen by donor countries as a form venture capital -high risk but with potentially high rewards. 109 Ultimately, reducing the overall incidence of conflict by stimulating economic growth and alleviating poverty in the world's poorest countries would help mitigate threats to U.S. and international security. For, when conflicts ignite, they impact directly the lives and livelihoods of those in war zones, but these wars can also destabilize entire regions, as did Liberia and Congo, and require costly international peacekeeping and humanitarian interventions. U.S. foreign policy has all but ignored poverty alleviation and the destructive, costly cycles of conflict and poverty that plague many developing countries, and it currently fails to fully reflect the knowledge imparted by recent research on poverty and civil war. Indeed, combating poverty and improving governance in weak states is today the weakest area of U.S. foreign assistance programs. 111 To bolster U.S. security, President Bush instead stresses the virtues of promoting democracy despite setbacks in Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian Territories. Yet if the goal of democracy promotion in Iraq and elsewhere is laudable, research on the economic sources of civil war suggests that little progress is likely to be made in such countries absent a concomitant well-funded, comprehensive poverty alleviation strategy that includes the world's poorest countries. 112 Given the potential conflict prevention benefits that poverty alleviation would offer, as well as the significant transnational human and economic costs of civil conflict, it is past time we refocus our national security priorities and investments to reflect what we now know about poverty's significant role in fueling civil conflict.
